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The Discourse of Deception and 
Characterization in Attic Oratory 
Christos Kremmydas 
T FIRST SIGHT it seems that the Attic orators resorted to 
allegations of deception liberally in order to discredit 
their opponents’ ethos. They also appear regularly to 
disclaim deception so as to appear to the audience honest and 
reliable. Such rhetorical uses of this concept are not surprising 
in the wider context of Athenian democracy which prized 
openness and prohibited deception of the demos.1 According to 
one passage reporting the law against deception of the people, 
“if a man deceives the people by a promise, he shall be liable to 
eisangelia” ([Dem.] 49.67), while another adds that it prescribed 
the death penalty for anyone convicted of deceiving the people 
through false promises (Dem. 20.135).2 Although only two 
cases involving apate tou demou (“deception of the demos”) are 
known to have been prosecuted (both in the fifth century),3 
orators continued into the fourth century to capitalize on the 
rhetorical potential of allegations and disclaimers of deception 
in the law courts and assembly. The orators expressed these 
 
1 J. Hesk, Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2000), esp. 
ch. 1, provides an excellent discussion of the Athenian ideological back-
ground. 
2 See also nn.45 and 46 below.  
3 The two cases are those of Miltiades (Hdt. 6.136.1) and the one occur-
ring in the aftermath of the generals’ trial after Arginusae (Xen. Hell. 
1.7.35). It cannot be determined whether the nomos eisangeltikos as attested 
from fourth-century quotations was in operation throughout the fifth cen-
tury. It is likely that a charge of deception of the demos was recognized as an 
actionable offence prosecuted through probole. 
A 
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allegations and disclaimers of deception through what I call the 
‘discourse of deception’, that is, vocabulary and topoi denoting 
deception, and passages analyzing its operation.4 Study of 
fourth-century Attic deliberative and forensic speeches will 
show that the discourse of deception was not employed indis-
criminately but was a powerful rhetorical strategy of portraying 
the ethos of the opponent, the speaker, and (more rarely) the 
audience, and operated within context-specific boundaries.  
I shall argue that the diversity of the expressions of the dis-
course of deception is not due simply to the orators’ individual 
style but represents strategies adapted to different rhetorical 
situations and needs. I shall attempt to show how different 
topoi denoting deception help achieve different rhetorical 
effects and how the legal and rhetorical context determined the 
choice of topoi employed. The difference, in the use of topoi 
denoting deception, between deliberative and forensic, public 
and private prosecution, and public and private defence 
speeches seems to confirm that the orators paid attention to 
context-specific rhetorical ‘protocols’5 which placed limits on 
their use of the discourse of deception but at the same time 
helped them maximize the effect of this rhetorical strategy of 
characterization.  
Recent scholarship has examined the concept of deception in 
its ideological, political, and legal context in Classical Athens6 
 
4 In terms of vocabulary my examination covers the following nouns and 
verbs (see Appendix 2): (i) (ἐξ)ἀπάτη/(ἐξ)ἀπατέω, (ii) φενάκη/φενακισµός/ 
φενακίζω, (iii) παρακρούοµαι, (iv) παράγω (-οµαι), (v) (ἀπό)πλανάω. I omit 
terms for ‘lying’ (ψεῦδος, ψεύδοµαι; the exception is Aeschin. 3.98–99, a 
key passage describing in detail Demosthenes’ deceptive rhetoric, which was 
clearly not confined to lying) because ‘lying’ is a more specific term than 
‘deceiving’ (a subaltern term), but also because of limitations of space. 
5 A parallel for the limitations imposed upon the use of specific terms in 
official contexts is the ban on the use of ‘unparliamentary language’ in the 
Houses of Parliament: see www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/ 
unparliamentary-language. 
6 J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1989); Hesk, Decep-
tion and Democracy; M. Christ, “Ostracism, Sycophancy, and Deception of the 
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and suggested that topoi denoting deception are effective be-
cause they build on shared ideological presuppositions of the 
Athenians; but the use of deception in strategies of rhetorical 
characterization has not attracted much scholarly attention. At 
the same time, the significance of procedural distinctions in 
determining rhetorical strategies adopted in forensic oratory 
has only recently been highlighted.7 In my examination of the 
discourse of deception as a means of portraying ethos, I adopt 
the view that the choice of procedure affected the rhetorical 
strategies used in the law courts; I expand on it by also con-
sidering deliberative oratory and further contextual factors. I 
believe that this rhetorical study can contribute not only to a 
better understanding of ethos in oratory but also to a better ap-
preciation of how rhetorical context helped shape strategies of 
persuasion in the Attic orators.  
I discuss first the most elaborate strategy of characterization 
through deception, namely passages where the orators do not 
simply allege deception but also provide details regarding its 
operation. Although such passages throw negative light on the 
opponent by exposing his rhetorical deceptions, they also 
enable the speaker to project his own image as an experienced 
and trustworthy advisor of the city. I then examine in detail the 
use of various recurrent expressions denoting rejection of de-
ception (anti-deception topoi) in forensic and deliberative 
oratory8 of the fourth century, and categorize them according 
to their function and rhetorical intensity (see Appendix 1). 
___ 
Demos: [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.5,” CQ 42 (1992) 336–346. 
7 L. Rubinstein, “Differentiated Rhetorical Strategies in the Athenian 
Courts,” in M. Gagarin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law 
(Cambridge 2005) 129–145. 
8 The discourse of deception is too rare in surviving epideictic oratory: if 
one excludes attestations in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen and the Periclean 
funeral oration in Thucydides, there is a single attestation, [Dem.] 61.32. 
However, since the sample of extant epideictic oratory is so small, this is 
probably not significant. 
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Finally, I consider a number of contextual factors affecting the 
use of the discourse of deception in Attic oratory.  
The ‘mechanics’ of deception and characterization  
The reality of rhetorical deception is regularly referred to by 
public speakers as a fact of civic life. Demosthenes repeatedly 
reminds his audience that they have been deceived all too often 
in the past in their public decision-making.9 The discourse of 
deception is thus expected to occur in the context of general 
warnings against rhetorical manipulation by crafty orators or 
more specific finger-pointing at political or law court op-
ponents. However, on occasion the orators go beyond the mere 
use of a topos as they also provide details about the ‘mechanics’ 
of rhetorical deception in order to expose the ways in which 
their opponents deceive the audience. Some of the passages 
highlight a single deceptive technique employed by their op-
ponents (e.g. rhetorical manipulation of documents), while 
others shed light on cognitive and psychological aspects of de-
ception, or analyze a whole gamut of techniques employed by 
an opponent in order to take in the audience. The apparent 
objective of such passages is to raise the audience’s awareness 
of the opponent’s deceptive intentions; but, once again, their 
key goal is to project the ethos of the speaker as an experienced, 
trustworthy individual/politician, while undermining the char-
acter of his opponent. These passages occur primarily in public 
prosecution speeches with strong political overtones (e.g. Aes-
chines 3, Demosthenes 19), but they are also occasionally at-
tested in deliberative speeches.  
In one of the passages (Aeschin. 3.168 ff.) the speaker sug-
gests that Athenian audiences are impressed and consequently 
deceived by orators’ rhetorical skill. It is true that many of the 
anti-deception topoi (for which see below) seem to imply that 
the opponent’s rhetorical ability facilitated his attempted de-
ception of the people (note the paradox of using rhetorical skill 
to denounce the opponent’s rhetoric), yet in the passage in 
 
9 E.g. Dem. 8.63, 15.16, 20.3, 23.96.  
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question the speaker is more specific: in his speech in the trial 
against Ctesiphon in 330, Aeschines suggests that Demos-
thenes’ rhetoric in the ekklesia deceives the people and advises 
his dicastic audience not to be taken in by Demosthenes’ 
“auspicious” words (εὐφηµία … τῶν λόγων). Aeschines draws a 
stark contrast between the deceptive mask, the façade of sweet-
sounding rhetoric, and what is un-maskable, namely Demos-
thenes’ true nature (φύσιν) and the truth (ἀλήθειαν), and he 
pledges to expose the glaring inconsistencies between Demos-
thenes’ ostensibly civic-spirited, but deceptive, rhetoric and his 
actions. It is obvious that Aeschines is trying to capitalize on 
possible anti-rhetorical prejudice in the audience as he casts his 
opponent in the mould of the sophist-deceiver (3.168, transl. 
Carey):10 
ἂν µὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν εὐφηµίαν αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων ἀποβλέπητε, 
ἐξαπατηθήσεσθε, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰς τὴν φύσιν καὶ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθε. 
Well, if you keep your eyes on his fine words, you will be tricked; 
but if you keep them on his natural character and the reality, 
you won’t be.11  
Aeschines is not only trying to take advantage of any anti-
sophistic bias in the audience; he is also building on their 
knowledge of Demosthenes’ public profile as an orator and 
tries to undermine it throughout his speech. To this end, he 
goes into greater detail regarding the mechanics of Demos-
thenes’ deceptive rhetoric at different points in his speech.  
A little earlier in the speech, Aeschines exposes a number of 
features of Demosthenes’ peculiar (ἴδιον καὶ οὐ κοινὸν) decep-
tive discourse; he maintains that his adversary is able to imitate 
 
10 Cf. Aeschin. 1.169, where Philip’s εὐφηµία is commended and con-
trasted with the ἀκοσµία of Demosthenes’ general conduct. Note Dem. 
Epist. 2.19 where he stresses his εὐφηµία in the face of public criticism. 
εὐφηµία also describes the language used in decrees at Aeschin. 3.92, Dem. 
19.48. 
11 Translations are from M. Gagarin (ed.), The Oratory of Classical Greece 
(Austin 1998– ).  
56 DECEPTION AND CHARACTERIZATION 
————— 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 53 (2013) 51–89 
 
 
 
 
all the tell-tale signs of truth in order to disguise his deception 
of the Athenian people: i) he lies under oath and thus shame-
lessly manipulates religious sensitivities,12 ii) he gives an impres-
sion of specificity regarding future events and individuals, and 
iii) he demonstrates feigned confidence in his own predictions 
(3.98–99):  
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἅνθρωπος ἴδιον καὶ οὐ κοινὸν ποιεῖ. οἱ µὲν γὰρ 
ἄλλοι ἀλαζόνες, ὅταν τι ψεύδωνται, ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσαφῆ πει-
ρῶνται λέγειν, φοβούµενοι τὸν ἔλεγχον· Δ∆ηµοσθένης δ᾽ ὅταν 
ἀλαζονεύηται, πρῶτον µὲν µεθ᾽ ὅρκου ψεύδεται, ἐξώλειαν 
ἐπαρώµενος ἑαυτῷ, δεύτερον δέ, ἃ εὖ οἶδεν οὐδέποτε ἐσόµενα, 
τολµᾷ λέγειν εἰς ὁπότ᾽ ἔσται, καὶ ὧν τὰ σώµατα οὐχ ἑώρακε, 
τούτων τὰ ὀνόµατα λέγει, κλέπτων τὴν ἀκρόασιν καὶ µι-
µούµενος τοὺς τἀληθῆ λέγοντας. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα ἄξιός ἐστι 
µισεῖσθαι, ὅτι πονηρὸς ὢν καὶ τὰ τῶν χρηστῶν σηµεῖα δια-
φθείρει. 
This, you see, is the peculiarity that distinguishes Demosthenes 
from other men. All other braggarts, when telling lies, try to 
make vague and imprecise statements, because they fear refuta-
tion. But Demosthenes, when making grandiose claims, firstly 
adds an oath to his lies, calling destruction down on himself, and 
secondly has the nerve to give a date for events he knows will 
never happen and provides the names of people he has not seen 
in person, deceiving his hearers and mimicking the manner of 
people telling the truth. And for this he deserves fierce hatred, 
because as well as being a criminal, he also obliterates the signs 
that distinguish honest men. 
Aeschines’ negative characterization of Demosthenes as a de-
ceiver is strengthened further through an explicit appeal to the 
emotions of the dikastai: he seeks to arouse their hatred towards 
him (ἄξιός ἐστι µισεῖσθαι). 
He goes on to elaborate further Demosthenes’ deceptive 
strategies and sheds light on the mechanics of deception in the 
Athenian ekklesia. Although he is referring here to a specific oc-
 
12 Cf. Lycurg. 1.79 on the civic importance of oaths; on perjury as an 
ethico-religious and legal offence see J. Plescia, Oath and Perjury in Ancient 
Greece (Talahassee 1970) 85–91. 
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casion of deception of the demos, he is probably insinuating that 
the features singled out are characteristic of Demosthenes’ de-
ceptive tactics. He highlights the length of the decree quoted 
(ψήφισµα … µακρότερον µὲν τῆς Ἰλιάδος), the vacuousness of 
its contents, and the vain hopes it gave rise to (3.100):  
ταῦτα δ᾽ εἰπὼν δίδωσιν ἀναγνῶναι ψήφισµα τῷ γραµµατεῖ µα-
κρότερον µὲν τῆς Ἰλιάδος, κενότερον δὲ τῶν λόγων οὓς εἴωθε 
λέγειν, καὶ τοῦ βίου ὃν βεβίωκε, µεστὸν δ᾽ ἐλπίδων οὐκ ἐσο-
µένων καὶ στρατοπέδων οὐδέποτε συλλεγησοµένων. ἀπαγαγὼν 
δ᾽ ὑµᾶς ἄπωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ κλέµµατος καὶ ἀνακρεµάσας ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἐλπίδων, ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἤδη συστρέψας γράφει … 
After this speech, he gave the clerk a decree to read out that was 
longer than the Iliad and emptier than the speeches he likes to 
make and the life he has led, but full of hopes that would not be 
fulfilled and armies that would never be mustered. After divert-
ing your attention well away from the swindle and raising you 
up with hopes, he at last gathered his confidence and proposed 
… 
Aeschines then instructs the court clerk to read (ἀνάγνωθι· τοῦ 
κλέµµατος ἅψαι) specific clauses from the decree in question 
which, in his view, prove Demosthenes’ deception (101). And, 
while the latter deceived the demos through this decree, 
Aeschines is able to uncover the deception by explaining the 
contents of this same decree.13  
Deception of Athenian audiences through what Aristotle 
(Rhet. 1355b) calls “artless proofs” (oaths, decrees, laws, witness 
statements) is touched on in further speeches of the orators. 
Either, as in the passage above, the document used by an 
opponent can be used to uncover the latter’s deception or the 
speaker adduces other documents to that end. In a passage in 
the speech On Halonnesus (343 B.C.) Demosthenes comments on 
Philocrates’ use of an illegal decree in order to promote Philip’s 
 
13 A little later in the speech Aeschines cites further factors exploited by 
Demosthenes in order to deceive the demos (3.125–126): a misleading προ-
βούλευµα, an inexperienced member of the council, and the timing of the 
vote in the assembly, which coincided with Aeschines’ absence. 
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deception of the people. He then contrasts this deceptive use of 
Philocrates’ ψήφισµα with his own legal proposal (τὰ ἔννοµα 
γράφοντα), whose aim is to reveal Philip’s deceit. Thus, both 
deception of the demos and its uncovering can take place 
through Athenian decrees (Dem. 7.25, transl. Trevett):  
τοῦτο µὲν οὖν παράνοµον ἦν το ψήφισµα, τὸ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους, 
καὶ οὐχ οἶον τ’ ἦν τὸν τὰ ἔννοµα γράφοντα ταὐτὰ τῷ παρανόµῳ 
ψηφίσµατι γράφειν. ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς προτέροις ψηφίσµασι, τοῖς 
οὖσιν ἐννόµοις καὶ σῴζουσι τὴν ὑµετέραν χώραν, ταὐτὰ γρά-
φων ἔννοµα τ’ ἔγραψα καὶ ἐξήλεγχον τὸν Φίλιππον, ὅτι ἐξηπάτα 
ὑµᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐπανορθώσασθαι ἐβούλετο τὴν εἰρήνην, ἀλλὰ 
τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν λέγοντας ἀπίστους καταστῆσαι.  
This decree—the one of Philocrates—was illegal, and the pro-
poser of a lawful decree could not have proposed the same thing 
as an illegal decree. But I proposed the same decree as those 
previous decrees that are lawful and that preserve your land, a 
lawful decree, and convicted Philip of deceiving you and of 
wishing not to revise the peace but to undermine the credibility 
of those who speak in your interest. 
About sixty years earlier, at the start of the speech On the 
Preservation of the Ancestral Constitution,14 the speaker of Lysias 34, 
too, had condemned the attempt by some Athenian politicians 
to deceive the people through decrees in order to re-introduce 
oligarchic features to the democracy through the back door 
(Lys. 34.1, transl. Todd):  
ὅτε ἐνοµίζοµεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰς γεγενηµένας συµφορὰς ἱκανὰ 
µνηµεῖα τῇ πόλει καταλελεῖφθαι, ὥστε µηδ’ ἂν τοὺς ἐπιγιγνο-
µένους ἑτέρας πολιτείας ἐπιθυµεῖν, τότε δὴ οὗτοι τοὺς κακῶς 
πεπονθότας καὶ ἀµφοτέρων πεπειραµένους ἐξαπατῆσαι ζητοῦσι 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ψηφίσµασιν, οἷσπερ καὶ πρότερον δὶς ἤδη.  
Just when we thought, men of Athens, that our recent disasters 
had left an adequate reminder to the city, such that not even our 
descendants would desire a different politeia (constitution), these 
men are now seeking to win over those who have suffered evil 
 
14 This purports to be a deliberative oration but even in antiquity there 
were doubts: see Dion. Hal. Lys. 32. 
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and have experienced both types of constitution, by means of 
the same proposals with which they have deceived us twice be-
fore. 
The decrees in question are not quoted in the rest of this par-
tially preserved speech, yet the speaker vilifies his opponents by 
suggesting that their attempts to deceive the people through 
these non-quoted decrees are not surprising (τούτων µὲν οὐ 
θαυµάζω). However, he also points out that people are either 
forgetful or willing (ἑτοιµότατοι) to put up with the wickedness 
of men like his opponents. Their manipulation of documents, 
well known to the demos, only makes their wickedness more 
obvious. Thus, the reference to documents as a means of 
rhetorical deception helps make the characterization of his 
opponents and audience all the more pronounced.  
Besides commenting on the manipulation of ‘artless’ means 
of persuasion to mislead and deceive the Athenians, the orators 
at times also refer to further factors facilitating rhetorical de-
ception, factors relating to emotions and the state of mind of 
individuals and mass audiences alike.15 Such passages under-
score the speaker’s deep knowledge of audience psychology and 
thus project an image of experience, knowledge, and reliability, 
while at the same time discrediting the opponent’s character.  
In his prosecution speech in the trial On the False Embassy, 
Demosthenes alleges that Aeschines has either been bribed by 
Philip and is wilfully deceiving the Athenians or duped because 
of his simple-mindedness and ignorance (19.101–102, transl. 
Yunis):  
 
15 The two extant classical rhetorical treatises have little to offer regarding 
the way in which deceptive discourse operates. Anaximenes does not touch 
on ἀπάτη (instead, he refers to ψεῦδος in connection with witness testimony 
and slave torture: e.g. 15.3–6, 16.2–3), while Aristotle has very little to say 
in his Rhetoric, where he stresses the responsibility of the individual in falling 
for different kinds of deceptions. He avers that one of the vices leading men 
to wrongdoing is “foolishness through being deceived about what is fair and 
unfair” (1368b). 
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ἀλλ᾽ ὅµως ὑµεῖς ἄφετ᾽ Αἰσχίνῃ τὰ δεινὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὑπερβάλ-
λοντα, ἂν δι᾽ εὐήθειαν ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλην ἄγνοιαν ἡντινοῦν λελυ-
µασµένος φανῇ. ἂν µέντοι διὰ πονηρίαν ἀργύριον λαβὼν καὶ 
δῶρα, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐξελεγχθῇ σαφῶς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν πεπραγµένων, 
µάλιστα µέν, εἰ οἷόν τ᾽, ἀποκτείνατε, εἰ δὲ µή, ζῶντα τοῖς 
λοιποῖς παράδειγµα ποιήσατε. σκοπεῖτε δὴ τὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων 
ἔλεγχον, ὡς δίκαιος ἔσται, µεθ᾽ ὑµῶν. ἀνάγκη δή που τοὺς λό-
γους τούτους Αἰσχίνην πρὸς ὑµᾶς εἰπεῖν τουτονί, τοὺς περὶ τῶν 
Φωκέων καὶ τῶν Θεσπιῶν καὶ τῆς Εὐβοίας, εἴπερ µὴ πεπρακὼς 
αὑτὸν ἑκὼν ἐξηπάτα, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ διαρρήδην ἀκούσανθ᾽ 
ὑποσχοµένου Φιλίππου ὅτι πράξει ταῦτα καὶ ποιήσει, ἢ εἰ µὴ 
τοῦτο, γοητευθέντα καὶ φενακισθέντα τῇ περὶ τἄλλα φιλανθρω-
πίᾳ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐλπίσαντα παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ. οὐκ ἔνεστι τούτων οὐδὲ ἓν 
χωρίς. 
Nevertheless, forgive Aeschines these horrible, unprecedented 
crimes, if the harm he did seems the result of stupidity or some 
other form of ignorance. But if it seems that the result of corrup-
tion, of taking money and bribes, and if the facts themselves 
clearly make the case, by all means put him to death if you 
possibly can, but failing that, make him a living example for the 
future. Now consider for yourselves whether the proof of this 
matter is not entirely just. When Aeschines here made those 
speeches—the ones concerning Phocis, Thespiae, and Euboea—
if he had not been bribed and was not consciously deceiving 
you, then there are only two possible explanations: either he 
heard Philip actually promise that he would act in that way and 
do those things, or else, having been mesmerized and duped by 
Philip’s overall generosity, he expected it to carry over to these 
other matters, too. Apart from these alternatives, nothing else is 
possible. 
Demosthenes’ alternative explanations for Aeschines’ conduct 
(either naïveté or wickedness) represent two rival represen-
tations of his opponent’s character: Aeschines is portrayed as 
either deceiver or deceived. If he did receive a bribe from 
Philip and went on to deceive the people, he should be exe-
cuted; however, if he did not, and was not willingly deceiving 
the demos (εἴπερ µὴ πεπρακὼς αὑτὸν ἑκὼν ἐξηπάτα), this was 
because he had received an explicit promise by Philip or 
because, having fallen under his spell, he had been deceived 
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hoping that he would carry out his promises. However, if he 
had been the victim of Philip’s deception, he would be on the 
same level as the demos who have often been deceived by the 
deceptive promises of Athenian politicians. Demosthenes pro-
ceeds to rule out this possibility, emphasizing that Aeschines is 
a mercenary deceiver (110). This is a piece of masterful char-
acterization: by first likening Aeschines to the demos in terms of 
their susceptibility to deception but then ruling out this pos-
sibility and stressing that he is a deceiver, Demosthenes creates 
distance between his opponent and the audience with the in-
tention of arousing their anger. Some of the features high-
lighted here in connection with Aeschines’ possible deception 
by Philip are often cited in other contexts in connection with 
the demos’ deception: naïveté (εὐήθεια),16 ignorance (ἄγνοια), 
and hope (ἐλπίσαντα).  
Although the mention of such features portrays the ethos of 
the demos too, it avoids alienating audiences either in the 
assembly or in the law courts. Naïveté, a trait with moderately 
derogatory overtones,17 can be attributed both to individuals 
and to the Athenian demos. It is a character weakness, a quality 
of the victim, and, paired with ignorance, is said to offer an ad-
vantage to potential deceivers.18 Meanwhile, ignorance of the 
issues at hand,19 or of the character of an enemy,20 is easily 
manipulated by cunning orators/politicians. Demosthenes sug-
gests that Philip, as an expert deceiver, successfully exploited 
the Greeks’ ignorance of the danger he posed alongside other 
subversive methods such as bribery and engendering stasis in 
the cities (Dem. 18.61–62, transl. Yunis):  
 
16 Sometimes the synonymous term ἀβελτερία (“silliness, fatuity”: LSJ 
s.v.) is used alongside εὐήθεια (e.g. Dem. 19.98). 
17 E.g. Aeschin. 3.256. 
18 E.g. Dem. 19.98, 101, Ex. 24.2, 46.4. 
19 E.g. Aeschin. 3.237, Dem. 9.64, 18.133–134, 196 (an orator’s own ig-
norance), 246 (the responsibility of the orator in addressing the problem of 
ignorance), Ep. 1.2. 
20 The Athenians are unaware of Philip’s character: e.g. Dem. 2.7. 
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καὶ πρότερον κακῶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔχοντας πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ 
στασιαστικῶς ἔτι χεῖρον διέθηκε, τοὺς µὲν ἐξαπατῶν, τοῖς δὲ 
διδούς, τοὺς δὲ πάντα τρόπον διαφθείρων, καὶ διέστησεν εἰς 
µέρη πολλά, ἑνὸς τοῦ συµφέροντος ἅπασιν ὄντος, κωλύειν 
ἐκεῖνον µέγαν γίγνεσθαι. ἐν τοιαύτῃ δὲ καταστάσει καὶ ἔτ᾽ 
ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ συνισταµένου καὶ φυοµένου κακοῦ τῶν ἁπάντων 
Ἑλλήνων ὄντων …21 
and though the Greeks were already ill-disposed to one another 
and rent with faction, he made things worse; some he tricked, 
some he bought, others he thoroughly corrupted. Thus, he di-
vided Greece into many blocs though one policy was advan-
tageous for all: to prevent his becoming powerful. Since all 
Greeks were in this situation, still ignorant of the gathering, 
growing evil … 
But while the people’s ignorance can be abused by a devious 
orator bent on misleading an audience, it also justifies the role 
of the orator as teacher in matters of public interest (cf. the 
recurrent topos διδάξω ὑµᾶς).22  
Besides naïveté and ignorance, Attic orators also cite the 
desire of the demos to hear gratifying things as an additional 
factor exploited by deceptive orators.23 In his Third Philippic 
Demosthenes likens the demos’ fondness for gratifying rhetoric 
in their public deliberations to that of the Euboeans, the 
Olynthians, and the Oreians, Greek peoples who had already 
suffered at the hands of Philip (9.63–64). Meanwhile, in one of 
his prooimia he argues that a deceptive orator can be dis-
tinguished from a civic-spirited one by whether his rhetoric 
pleases the audience or he is ready to endure adverse crowd 
 
21 Cf. Dem. 2.7, 18.33, Aeschin. 3.237 (contrast between the ignorance of 
some and the knowledge of others among the audience); contrast Philip’s 
knowledge of Greek affairs as a factor contributing to his success: Aeschin. 
3.148, Dem. 7.5. 
22 E.g. Aeschin. 3.18, 32, 41, 181, 238, Andoc. 1.8, 10, 34, Dem. 4.22, 
8.57, 15.1, 18.26, Lys. 7.3. 
23 E.g. Aeschin. 3.127, Isoc. 15.133; cf. Dem. 1.15, 18.138, Xen. Mem. 
2.1.28, Arist. Rhet. 1364b, Eth.Nic. 1113b. See H. Yunis, Taming Democracy: 
Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens (Ithaca 1996) 125. 
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reaction for the sake of the city (Ex. 5.1, transl. Worthington):  
ὁρῶ µέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παντάπασι πρόδηλον ὂν οὕς τ᾽ ἂν 
ἀκούσαιτε λόγους ἡδέως καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὐκ οἰκείως ἔχετε· οὐ 
µὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ µὲν λέγειν ἅ τις οἴεται χαριεῖσθαι τῶν παρακρού-
σασθαί τι βουλοµένων εἶναι νοµίζω, τὸ δ᾽ ὑφίστασθαι, περὶ ὧν 
πέπεικεν ἑαυτὸν συµφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καὶ θορυβηθῆναι κἂν ἄλ-
λο τι βούλησθ᾽ ὑµεῖς, εὔνου καὶ δικαίου τοῦτο πολίτου κρίνω.24 
I see, gentlemen of Athens, that it is entirely clear which 
speeches you listen to with pleasure and which you are not 
pleased to hear. Nevertheless, I consider that the mark of those 
who want to deceive you is to say what they think will please 
you, whereas I judge that the loyal and fair citizen is the one 
who will withstand your jeers and whatever else you wish to do 
and propose what he himself feels is in the best interests of the 
city. 
The message that Demosthenes wishes to convey is that he is 
an honest, reliable, and patriotic orator even though the advice 
he gives may come across as disagreeable. Conversely, any 
orators indulging the audience should be recognized as de-
ceivers.  
A final factor manipulated by deceptive orators is hope. 
People tend to believe what they hope for, irrespective of 
whether it is true or not,25 and deceptive politicians pander to 
them offering them false hopes. This is how Aeschines deceives 
the people, according to Demosthenes (19.333):  
τί οὖν λέγω καὶ πόθεν ἄρχοµαι κατηγορεῖν; τοῦ ποιουµένης τῆς 
πόλεως εἰρήνην Φιλοκράτει συνειπεῖν, ἀλλὰ µὴ τοῖς τὰ βέλ-
τιστα γράφουσι, καὶ τοῦ δῶρ᾽ εἰληφέναι, τοῦ µετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς 
ὑστέρας πρεσβείας τοὺς χρόνους κατατρῖψαι καὶ µηδὲν ὧν 
προσετάξαθ᾽ ὑµεῖς ποιῆσαι, τοῦ φενακίσαι τὴν πόλιν καὶ παρα-
στήσαντ᾽ ἐλπίδας, ὡς ὅσα βουλόµεθ᾽ ἡµεῖς Φίλιππος πράξει … 
 
24 Cf. also Dem. 10.2. 
25 Cf. Dem. 19.27 (a combination of “hopes, deceptions, and promises”: 
ἐλπίσι καὶ φενακισµοῖς καὶ ὑποσχέσεσιν), 19.102 (manipulation of hope 
and self-deception at the same time), Aeschin. 3.101, 105. 
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What, then, do I mean, and from what point do I begin my ac-
cusations? From the point when in the midst of the deliberations 
on peace he supported Philocrates and not the proponents of the 
best policy; when he took bribes; when later on the Second Em-
bassy, he wasted time and followed none of your instructions; 
when he tricked the city and destroyed everything by creating 
the expectation that Philip would do whatever you wanted ... 
In this section I have discussed passages where the orators 
comment on the ways in which their opponents deceive the 
people. They deplore the way in which deceptive orators 
manipulate decrees and oaths, take advantage of the demos’ 
ignorance and naïveté, and even exploit aspects of mass 
psychology. By giving an impression of detailed knowledge of 
their opponents’ tactics, such passages appear to serve an ‘edu-
cational’ role, instructing the demos on how to identify and 
avoid the deceptions by orators who do not have the city’s best 
interests at heart. However, their main function is as means of 
characterization, by portraying these deceptive orators as a foil 
for the speaker.  
This same purpose is also served by a less elaborate but more 
frequently attested manifestation of the discourse of deception. 
Recurrent expressions disclaiming deception, denouncing the 
opponent’s deception, or describing the demos’ past dealings 
with deceptive orators (anti-deception topoi) abound in the 
orators and demonstrate diversity in terms of their wording, 
intensity, and intended effect as they are employed in different 
rhetorical contexts.  
Anti-deception topoi and characterization  
In the Rhetoric Aristotle lists twenty-eight topoi of enthy-
memes and nine topoi of fallacious enthymemes and provides 
examples of their use as means of rational argumentation in 
contemporary drama and oratory (e.g. Rhet. 1358a, 1396a–
1402a). However, he does not adequately define these topoi or 
examine their further functions apart from those related to 
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rational argumentation.26 Modern scholarship has addressed 
the absence of definitions and discussed how these rhetorical 
topoi reveal Athenian civic ideology. Ober provides the follow-
ing definition:27  
When addressing a mass audience, the Athenian orator used 
symbols, in the form of modes of address and metaphors, that 
derived from and referred to the common ideological frame of 
reference of his listeners. At least some metaphors became 
standardized and can be described as topoi … Indeed, topoi were 
reiterated precisely because of their symbolic value and demon-
strated power to influence an audience.  
Following up on Ober’s analysis of topoi as content-specific 
rhetorical strategies, Hesk adds that they were also context-
specific.28 In another publication, he discusses in detail the ‘as 
you all know’ commonplace and examines how it is ‘decon-
structed’ by orators in different contexts.29 My examination of 
topoi denouncing deception differs from theirs in that I am 
adopting a more detailed lexical approach, in order to identify 
variations in the expression of topoi and to consider their im-
portance in different rhetorical contexts. Although my defini-
tion of anti-deception topoi as ‘recurrent expressions alleging 
or renouncing deception’ is more fixed than the definition of 
topoi adopted by these two scholars, my search yields a far 
higher number of anti-deception topoi.  
A typology of anti-deception topoi  
While the anti-deception topoi attested in the orators are 
primarily a means of rhetorical characterization of speaker and 
opponent, they may also strengthen the refutation of the latter’s 
 
26 His treatment of “common topics” as artistic means of persuasion is 
restricted to discussions of topics appealing to the character of different 
audiences. 
27 Mass and Elite 44. 
28 J. Hesk, “ ‘Despisers of the Commonplace’: Meta-topoi and Para-topoi 
in Attic Oratory,” Rhetorica 25 (2007) 361–384, esp. 363–365. 
29 Hesk, Deception and Democracy 227–231. 
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arguments or help introduce the speaker’s own arguments. My 
study shows variation in terminology and varying levels of rhe-
torical intensity between different anti-deception topoi: orators 
had to adapt topoi depending on the rhetorical effect they 
wanted to achieve and always within the boundaries set by the 
wider rhetorical and legal context. Since characterization re-
mained the primary objective of anti-deception topoi, I cat-
egorize them according to the person they characterize; each 
category is then divided into sub-categories in an ascending 
order of rhetorical intensity:  
i) topoi characterizing an opponent(s),  
ii) topoi characterizing the speaker,  
iii) topoi describing the demos’ previous experiences of  
  deception. 
This categorization will help highlight their operation in differ-
ent contexts and explain their rhetorical effects as well as the 
limits within which they operate.30  
Category i a, “He/they will attempt to deceive you”  
This is by far the most frequently attested sub-category of 
anti-deception topoi (for variants see Appendix 1, cat. i d) used 
to discredit the opponent by portraying him as an agent of de-
ception. The wording used by the orator is cautious lest he 
alienate his audience; this topos portrays deception as an at-
tempt, an intention, rather than a certainty (e.g. ἐξαπατῆσαι 
ὑµᾶς πειράσεται, Lys. 13.70; ἐξαπατῆσαι ὑµᾶς βούλονται, 
Isae. 4.1; προσδοκῶν ὑµᾶς ἐξαπατῆσαι, Isae. 11.22).  
While its main rhetorical function is to undermine the 
opponent’s ethos, it also implicitly aims at arousing hostile 
emotions towards him in the audience.31 At the same time, it 
 
30 For each sub-category of topoi, I am providing only a single heading (a 
translation or paraphrase) which is representative of its rhetorical function. 
A comprehensive list of variants in each sub-category is in Appendix 1. 
31 L. Rubinstein, “Stirring up Dicastic Anger,” in D. L. Cairns and R. A. 
Knox (eds.), Law, Rhetoric and Comedy in Classical Athens: Essays in Honour of 
Douglas M. MacDowell (Swansea 2004) 187–203, successfully demonstrated 
that overt appeals to anger in forensic speeches were context-specific: they 
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predisposes the audience negatively towards the opponent. A 
further subtle effect is to encourage the audience to take action 
against him. But since a mere allegation of deception is unlikely 
to persuade, this anti-deception topos forms part of a wider 
rhetorical strategy of attacking the opponent’s ethos and refuting 
his arguments. An example is found in Lycurgus’ Against Leocra-
tes. The prosecutor Lycurgus is accusing Leocrates of having 
deserted the city of Athens during the critical period before the 
battle of Chaeroneia, first fleeing to Rhodes and later returning 
to Megara where he pursued his commercial activities. He was 
prosecuted through eisangelia a few years after 338, and the 
prosecutor proposes the death penalty for his treason. The anti-
deception topos (πυνθάνοµαι δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν ὑµᾶς 
ἐξαπατᾶν λέγοντα) is used by Lycurgus at the start of his antici-
pation and refutation of arguments that he expected Leocrates 
and his supporting speakers to use (1.55, transl. Harris):  
ὡς µὲν οὖν ἔνοχός ἐστι τοῖς εἰσηγγελµένοις ἅπασιν, ὦ ἄνδρες, 
Λεωκράτης φανερόν ἐστι· πυνθάνοµαι δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν 
ὑµᾶς ἐξαπατᾶν λέγοντα, ὡς ἔµπορος ἐξέπλευσε καὶ κατὰ ταύ-
την τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀπεδήµησεν εἰς Ῥόδον. ἐὰν οὖν ταῦτα λέγῃ, 
ἐνθυµεῖσθ᾽ ᾧ ῥᾳδίως λήψεσθ᾽ αὐτὸν ψευδόµενον. 
It is clear that Leocrates is subject to punishment for all the 
charges brought against him. I know he will try to trick you by 
saying that he sailed as a merchant and that he went away to 
Rhodes for business reasons. If he says this, look at how easily 
you will catch him lying. 
This anti-deception topos builds on the statement of Leocrates' 
guilt (ὡς µὲν οὖν ἔνοχός ἐστι), while his deception is proved in 
55–56 through the use of three consecutive arguments based 
on circumstantial evidence (the location of Leocrates’ exit point 
from Athens, the identity of his companions on the flight from 
Athens, and the fact that he has sold his property in Athens 
and set up home in Megara). The details of his deception are 
___ 
depended on the type of suit in which the speeches were delivered and the 
type of penalty that could be imposed. 
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set out in logical and easily comprehensible terms, so that the 
members of the audience are equipped to uncover Leocrates' 
deceptions. Finally, it is worth noting that ψευδόµενον is also 
used for variatio (instead of ἐξαπατῶντα), and that, according to 
the speaker, Leocrates will be easily (ῥᾳδίως) caught lying by 
the dikastai themselves, if he uses the line of argument just an-
ticipated by Lycurgus.  
While this topos portrays deception as an intention on the 
part of the opponent or as a possibility, the wording of the next 
topos is somewhat stronger, as the opponent’s deception is 
presented almost as a certainty, which the audience will be at 
pains to escape without the speaker’s help.  
Category i b, “You will not realize that you have been deceived”  
The reference to the agent of deception is not explicit in this 
anti-deception topos, although it can be deduced from the 
context; the topos is addressed to the dicastic audience in the 
second-person plural. At the same time as predisposing the 
audience negatively towards the opponent’s arguments, it helps 
to raise the audience’s awareness of the danger of deception 
and underlines their need to be ‘taught’ by the speaker in order 
to evade the opponent’s deception.32 This anti-deception topos 
occurs mainly in Aeschines’ public prosecution speeches Against 
Timarchus (1.117) and Ctesiphon (3.11, 168). In a passage from 
Against Ctesiphon, it precedes Aeschines’ systematic analysis of his 
opponent’s own supposed defence arguments and is accom-
panied by an allegation that the opponent’s rhetoric is super-
seding the city’s laws (κρείττονες λόγοι τῶν νόµων). Aeschines 
thus attempts to portray Ctesiphon’s defence team not just as 
skilled deceivers but also as potentially subversive and un-
democratic (3.11):  
 
32 Cf. a similar topos at Dem. 45.44 (πρὸς δὴ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν 
ἀναίδειαν βέλτιόν ἐστι µικρὰ προειπεῖν ὑµῖν, ἵνα µὴ λάθητ᾽ ἐξαπατη-
θέντες), where it precedes the refutation of an argument advanced by 
Stephanus. 
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καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως εὖ προκατειληφότος τοῦ νοµοθέτου, εὕρηνται 
κρείττονες λόγοι τῶν νόµων, οὓς εἰ µή τις ὑµῖν ἐρεῖ, λήσετε 
ἐξαπατηθέντες. 
And though the legislator has taken this sensible precaution, ar-
guments have been invented to subvert the law; and if you are 
not told of them, you will not notice you have been tricked. 
It is worth noting that the supplementary aorist participle 
ἐξαπατηθέντες with λανθάνω stresses the furtive operation of 
deception through crafty rhetoric. Meanwhile the future in-
dicative of the protasis (εἰ µή τις ὑµῖν ἐρεῖ) denotes a threat or 
warning and in conjunction with the future indicative expresses 
a future condition.33  
A variation of this topos occurs in a passage from Against 
Timarchus where Aeschines anticipates and outlines the de-
fence’s arguments; in the process he takes the opportunity to 
portray Demosthenes (although he does not name him) as a 
sophistic deceiver who may deceive through false arguments 
(παραλογισάµενος) to the detriment of the city (1.117): 
ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ µὲν πρότερός µοι λόγος προδιήγησις τῆς ἀπολογίας ἧς 
ἀκούω µέλλειν γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα µὴ τοῦτο ἐµοῦ παραλιπόντος ὁ 
τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόµενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν 
ἀπάτῃ τινὶ παραλογισάµενος ὑµᾶς ἀφέληται τὸ τῆς πόλεως 
συµφέρον. 
My first theme is an advance account of the defense that I am 
told will be offered, in case, if I fail to mention it, the man who 
advertises that he can teach young men the art of speaking, 
tricks you with false logic and prevents a result to the city’s ad-
vantage. 
In this passage, the use of the dative of instrument (ἀπάτῃ τινὶ) 
alongside παραλογισάµενος probably does not have as strong 
an effect as e.g. ἐξαπατήσῃ ὑµᾶς ἀφελόµενος τὸ τῆς πόλεως 
συµφέρον. Thus, the rhetorical intensity of the sentence may 
 
33 See H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge [Mass.] 1920) 525 §2328; 
W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (London 1886) 
165 §447. 
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have been lower.  
In sum, this topos places emphasis on the fact that the op-
ponent’s deception will go unnoticed unless the audience pay 
attention to the speaker who can unmask it. Its expression is 
stronger than the previous anti-deception topos but clearly not 
as assertive as the next one.  
Category i c, “Do not be deceived by him” 
This anti-deception topos undermines the character of the 
opponent while placing the burden of responsibility on the 
audience: the implication is that they can escape the op-
ponent’s deception as they can tell truth from lies. The orator’s 
role is only ancillary: he anticipates and refutes the opponent’s 
arguments. Meanwhile, the syntax conveys a greater sense of 
urgency and intensity.  
In a passage of the speech Against Andocides (falsely attributed 
to Lysias), the imperative µηδ’ … ἐξαπατᾶσθε builds on the 
allegation that the line of defence adopted by the defendant 
Andocides is a lie (οὐκ … ἀληθὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀπολογία). The 
sentence rounds off the refutation of one of Andocides’ main 
arguments, namely that he was covered by the Amnesty, and 
therefore should not have been indicted ([Lys.] 6.38–41). It also 
precedes the refutation of yet another argument allegedly to be 
advanced by Andocides (41, transl. Todd): 
οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτῳ ἀληθὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀπολογία, 
µηδ᾽ ὑµεῖς ἐξαπατᾶσθε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο λύειν ἐστὶ τὰ συγκείµενα, 
εἰ Ἀνδοκίδης ἕνεκα τῶν ἰδίων ἁµαρτηµάτων δίδωσι δίκην, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐάν τις ἕνεκα τῶν δηµοσίων συµφορῶν ἰδίᾳ τινὰ τιµωρῆται. 
This defense of his is not true, men of Athens. Do not be de-
ceived. What would break the settlement is not Andocides now 
paying the penalty for his own offenses, but if a person is some-
how punished as an individual because of public disasters. 
A variant of the topos occurs in another highly charged 
political context, in the third quarter of the fourth century, the 
turbulent trial concerning the Harpalus affair. One of the 
prosecutors, Hyperides, is attacking Demosthenes, his former 
political associate (Hyp. Dem. fr.3 col. 6, transl. Cooper): 
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Δ∆[ηµοσθένης] δ᾽ οὐ µόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ αὑτοῦ ἀγῶνος οἴεται δεῖν 
ὑµᾶς παρακρούσασθαι διαβαλὼν τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς 
ἄλλους ἀγῶνας ἅπαντας ἀφελέσθαι ζητεῖ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως· 
ὑπὲρ οὗ δεῖ ὑµᾶς νυνὶ βουλεύσασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, καὶ 
µὴ τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τούτου ἐξαπατηθῆναι. 
Not only does Demosthenes think he should deceive you at his 
own trial by slandering the report (apophasis), but he also wants to 
detract from all the other trials in the city. You must keep this in 
mind when you now make your deliberations, and do not be de-
ceived by this man’s argument. 
Hyperides juxtaposes two rival ‘musts’, both relating to the 
concept of deception: Demosthenes thinks he must deceive the 
dikastai by abusing the Council’s report (διαβαλὼν τὴν ἀπό-
φασιν), while the dikastai must pay attention to what is at stake 
and not be deceived. Hyperides thus portrays Demosthenes as 
an inveterate deceiver and incites anger against him, while 
seeking to empower the dikastai to stand up against Demos-
thenes’ deceptive tactics. The use of δεῖ + infinitive probably 
conveys the same sense of intensity as the use of the imperative 
in the first passage.  
Although the main objective of the anti-deception topoi 
examined so far is to describe the opponent as a deceiver, the 
opponent is referred to in the third person, while the audience 
is addressed in the second-person plural. Conversely, the final 
sub-category of topoi is the most intense as it confronts the op-
ponent directly in the second-person singular.  
Category i d: “You are deceiving them”  
This topos has the most confrontational tone, as it addresses 
the opponent in the second person (apostrophe) and is the least 
often used in the orators.  
In Against Ctesiphon Aeschines alleges that Demosthenes was 
unworthy of the honour proposed by Ctesiphon and that his 
involvement in recent events has been misrepresented. Demos-
thenes’ art of deception has rubbed off on his associate Ctesi-
phon; through the rhetorical device of apostrophe, Ctesiphon is 
accused of deceiving any ignorant Athenians and insulting 
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(ὑβρίζεις) those who possess knowledge and understanding 
(3.237): 
ὅταν δὲ τῆς πρὸς Θηβαίους συµµαχίας τὰς αἰτίας ἀνατιθῇς 
Δ∆ηµοσθένει, τοὺς µὲν ἀγνοοῦντας ἐξαπατᾷς, τοὺς δ᾽ εἰδότας καὶ 
αἰσθανοµένους ὑβρίζεις. 
But when you give Demosthenes the credit for the alliance with 
Thebes, you may deceive the ignorant, but you insult people 
who know the facts and are alert. 
The topos also occurs in a speech delivered in a commercial 
dispute. Demosthenes’ paragraphe speech Against Zenothemis re-
ports a dialogue between Protus and Zenothemis, where the 
former accuses the latter of colluding with Hegestratus to de-
ceive others for monetary gain. A bystander then interjects that 
Zenothemis, too, is a victim of Hegestratus’ deception (32.15, 
transl. MacDowell): 
“σὺ χρήµατα δέδωκας Ἡγεστράτῳ, µεθ᾽ οὗ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξηπά-
τηκας, ὅπως δανείσηται; καὶ σοὶ πολλάκις λέγοντος ὅτι τοῖς 
προϊεµένοις ἀπολεῖται τὰ χρήµατα, σὺ {οὖν} ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούων 
αὐτὸς ἂν προήκω;” ἔφη καὶ ἀναιδὴς ἦν. “οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ µάλιστ᾽ 
ἀληθῆ λέγεις,” τῶν παρόντων τις ὑπέλαβεν, “ὁ σὸς κοινωνὸς καὶ 
πολίτης, ὁ Ἡγέστρατος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξηπάτηκέν σε, καὶ ὑπὲρ 
τούτων αὐτὸς αὑτῷ θανάτου τιµήσας ἀπόλωλεν.” 
“Did you give money to Hegestratus, with whom you collab-
orated in deceiving other people so as to enable him to borrow, 
even though he repeatedly said to you that those who risked 
their money would love it? When you heard that, would you 
have risked your money?” He impudently said yes. “Well then,” 
interrupted one of those who were there, “if what you say is 
absolutely true, your partner and fellow-citizen, Hegestratus, it 
seems, deceived you, and he has condemned himself to death for 
it and perished.” 
Although one would expect this topos to feature more fre-
quently in prosecution speeches, its rarity may suggest that 
there was limited tolerance of it in forensic contexts. Its appear-
ance in the Demosthenes passage is part of a reported dialogue 
that took place earlier than the court proceedings and so its use 
may not have been construed as too confrontational for the 
court. Thus, it seems that the more direct and confrontational 
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an anti-deception topos regarding an opponent, the less fre-
quently it was employed.  
Although all the topoi in category i served the same primary 
goal of undermining the opponent’s ethos, less confrontationally 
worded ones were preferred in most contexts in order to avoid 
any negative reflections on the speaker’s own character.  
The next three topoi, category ii, are self-referential and con-
cern the character of the speaker. They, too, demonstrate some 
gradation in terms of their wording and the function they per-
form.  
Category ii a, “I shall not appear to deceive you”  
This topos precedes the presentation of the speaker’s own 
arguments34 and obviously contributes to the presentation of a 
credible and trustworthy persona right from the prooimion35 (it 
could be taken as a captatio benevolentiae). Although this seems to 
be the most straightforward verbal disclaimer of deception on 
the speaker’s part, there are only two attestations in Attic ora-
tory. The syntax is cautious (cf. cat. i a and i b above): instead 
of a future indicative (οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω…), a dependent parti-
cipial construction (Dem. 5.10) and a substantivized infinitive 
(Dem. 20.88). This suggests that orators in the assembly and 
the law courts generally avoided referring to deception in the 
first person,36 as though they might become ‘tainted’ by asso-
ciation.  
At the start of On the Peace Demosthenes establishes his cre-
dentials as a trustworthy and experienced adviser of the people 
of Athens by referring to three examples from their recent 
history when his advice proved correct (5.10–22). Before pro-
posing that the Athenians preserve the Common Peace, he says 
 
34 This compares to topoi where the orator stresses his sincerity: e.g. 
πάντα ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας εἰρηµένα, Dem. 18.21; cf. 23.151. 
35 Cf. the variation of the topos in the prooimion of Euryptolemus’ speech 
at Xen. Hell. 1.7.19.  
36 Cf. 71–72 above on the rare use of anti-deception topoi in the second-
person singular.  
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(10, transl. Trevett): 
τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιὰς ὑπισχνουµένων οἰκισθή-
σεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς µὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται κύριος, 
σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικιεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ὑµῖν 
ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀντ᾽ Ἀµφιπόλεως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι, 
καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισµούς, οἷς ὑπαχθέντες ὑµεῖς 
οὔτε συµφόρως οὔτ᾽ ἴσως καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας, οὐδὲν τού-
των οὔτ᾽ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσοµαι, ἀλλὰ προ-
ειπὼν ὑµῖν, ὡς οἶδ᾽ ὅτι µνηµονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ οἶδα οὔτε 
προσδοκῶ, νοµίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν. 
At that time some men were promising that Thespiae and 
Plataea would be restored, and that Philip would preserve the 
Phocians, if he got control of them, and would disperse the city 
of Thebes into villages, and that Oropus would be given to us, 
and that Euboea would be surrendered in return for Am-
phipolis, and were offering such hopes and deceiving you with 
promises, by which you were induced, neither to your advantage 
nor perhaps to your credit, to abandon the Phocians. But I shall 
show that I did not deceive you and was not silent about any of 
these matters but declared to you, as I am sure you remember, 
that I neither knew nor expected that any of these things would 
happen, and that I thought the speaker was talking nonsense. 
The anti-deception topos occupies the centre of a section that 
focuses on Demosthenes’ own persona, which is contrasted 
with his political adversaries’ ethos: on the one hand, he alleges 
deception against his opponents (τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενα-
κισµούς), while on the other, he presents his actions as em-
bodying honesty and boldness (οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσοµαι, 
ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑµῖν).  
Although this topos presents the most explicit disclaimer of 
deception, the rarity of its use along with its careful wording, 
and additional affirmations of honesty, may suggest (cf. cat. i d) 
that the concept of deception was used rhetorically with a great 
deal of caution, especially since the projection of the speaker’s 
ethos was at stake.  
Category ii b, “I will not allow you to be deceived” 
In this sub-category the speaker goes beyond merely stating 
that he will refrain from deception; he in fact assumes an active 
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role in exposing it and protecting his fellow citizens from it. As 
in the previous sub-category (ii a), his ethos as a wise, trust-
worthy, and proactive advisor is projected, and its function thus 
appears to correspond to that of sub-category i b.  
In the prooimion of his assembly speech For the Megalopolitans, 
Demosthenes stresses the difficulty of his rhetorical task be-
cause his fellow Athenians have already been deceived and are 
following diametrically opposed political courses (16.2). Even 
though he knows he will be attacked on both sides, he is keen 
to strike a middle course rather than allow some politicians to 
deceive the people (3, transl. Trevett):  
οὐ µὴν ἀλλ᾽ αἱρήσοµαι µᾶλλον αὐτός, ἂν ἄρα τοῦτο πάθω, 
δοκεῖν φλυαρεῖν, ἢ παρ᾽ ἃ βέλτιστα νοµίζω τῇ πόλει, προέσθαι 
τισὶν ὑµᾶς ἐξαπατῆσαι. 
Nevertheless, I would rather be thought to be talking nonsense, 
if indeed such is my fate, than allow certain men to deceive you, 
against what I believe are the city’s interests. 
Category ii c, reversing the topos: “He said I’d deceive you” 
While the two previous topoi stress the speaker’s honesty and 
his ability to forestall deception, and precede the presentation 
of his own arguments, this anti-deception topos represents his 
response to allegations of deception against him. This self-refer-
ential topos only occurs in Demosthenic forensic speeches. It 
implicitly affirms the currency and effectiveness of topoi refer-
ring to an opponent (cf. cat. i a, b) and helps the speaker refute 
his opponent’s allegation of deception and defend his ethos.  
The trial of Ctesiphon provides a fascinating passage where 
Demosthenes defends himself against Aeschines’ charges that 
he is a sophist and an accomplished deceiver. Although not 
personally indicted in this trial (he was Ctesiphon’s synegoros), he 
still bore the brunt of Aeschines’ invective (Dem. 18.276): 
… ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἁπλῶς καὶ µετ᾽ εὐνοίας πάντας εἰρηκὼς τοὺς 
λόγους, φυλάττειν ἐµὲ καὶ τηρεῖν ἐκέλευεν, ὅπως µὴ παρα-
κρούσοµαι µηδ᾽ ἐξαπατήσω, δεινὸν καὶ γόητα καὶ σοφιστὴν καὶ 
τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ὀνοµάζων, ὡς ἐὰν πρότερός τις εἴπῃ τὰ προσόνθ᾽ 
ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἄλλου, καὶ δὴ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοντα, καὶ οὐκέτι τοὺς 
ἀκούοντας σκεψοµένους τίς ποτ᾽ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. 
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ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι γιγνώσκετε τοῦτον ἅπαντες, καὶ πολὺ τούτῳ µᾶλ-
λον ἢ ἐµοὶ νοµίζετε ταῦτα προσεῖναι. 
… as if he himself were sincere and loyal in everything he says, 
he urges you to be alert and to guard against my misleading or 
deceiving you, and he calls me a skilful speaker, a sorcerer, a 
sophist, and other such names. He hopes that by pre-emptively 
ascribing his own attributes to another, this description will be 
accepted, and the audience will not consider any further what 
kind of person is saying these things. But I am confident that all 
of you know him and realize that those terms apply far more to 
him than they do to me. 
Defending himself against Aeschines’ allegations would not 
have been too easy for Demosthenes, as by 330 B.C. he was one 
of the highest-profile Athenian politicians, orators, logogra-
phers, and teachers of rhetoric, while his hostility to Aeschines 
was equally well known. Re-branding himself as an idiotes and 
playing down his rhetorical reputation was not an option; at 
the same time, Aeschines’ career was well known, too. The in-
tegrity and reputation of these two political rivals was at stake. 
In this passage Demosthenes is effectively telling the audience: 
‘You know who I am. You know who Aeschines is. You know 
that he, rather than I, is engaging in deception’. He thus at-
tempts to counter a topos used by Aeschines to discredit his 
ethos: he had alleged that the Athenians ought to watch out lest 
Demosthenes deceive them, because he is a “skilful speaker, a 
cheat, and a sophist” (δεινὸν καὶ γόητα καὶ σοφιστὴν).37 After 
questioning the qualities of Aeschines’ oratory (ὥσπερ … τοὺς 
λόγους is ironical and insinuates that he is not exactly a civic-
spirited speaker) Demosthenes argues that Aeschines is taking 
advantage of the rhetorical situation, namely that as a prosecu-
tor he speaks first and may thus have a better chance of per-
suading the audience.38 What is more, Aeschines is projecting 
his own deceptions onto Demosthenes (τὰ προσόνθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ περὶ 
 
37 See Aeschin. 3.137, 202.  
38 Cf. Aeschin. 2.1–6, Antiph. 5.74–80, Dem. 18.7, Lys. 19.4–6; see also 
Arist. Rhet. 1415a, 1418b. 
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ἄλλου). Demosthenes suggests that, since the character of the 
two men is well known to the audience, they should be able to 
discern that Aeschines rather than Demosthenes deceives 
them. The repetition of this suggestion using the indefinite and 
then the demonstrative pronoun (τις … τὰ προσόνθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ 
περὶ ἄλλου – τούτῳ µᾶλλον ἢ ἐµοὶ νοµίζετε ταῦτα προσεῖναι) 
is intended to impress it upon the audience. In order to dis-
tance himself even further from the allegation of deception lev-
elled against him, Demosthenes goes on to argue that, although 
he was a competent orator, he had only used the power of his 
eloquence (ἐµπειρία τοιαύτη) in a patriotic way, and thus he 
turns the tables on Aeschines (277).  
Although this topos would be expected to occur primarily in 
defence speeches in response to allegations of deception by the 
prosecution, a variant also occurs in Demosthenes’ prosecution 
speech Against Leptines, where he rebuts an allegation made by 
Leptines at the pre-trial stage of the anakrisis (20.98). Demos-
thenes alleges that Leptines would try to deceive the dikastai by 
arguing that the prosecution had wrongly appended a draft 
proposal to their graphe in order to deceive the thesmothetai. Lep-
tines’ allegation of deception against Demosthenes and the 
prosecution team is undermined by a counter-allegation of de-
ceptive intent directed at Leptines before it is refuted in a sec-
tion dealing with legal technicalities of the nomothesia procedure.  
This anti-deception topos helps Demosthenes cancel out the 
effect of the anti-deception topos (or topoi) used by his op-
ponent against him. He takes the opportunity to dispel any 
doubts about his ethos and preempts his opponent’s attack by 
implying that he is the real deceiver and thus further dis-
crediting his character.  
Category iii of anti-deception topoi focuses the demos’ previ-
ous experiences of deception and is used by the orators to spur 
the audience to action. While the first topos may portray the 
Athenians as susceptible to deception and needing to break 
away from this pattern of wrong decision-making, the second is 
more flattering to the demos as it stresses their ability to resist de-
ceitful orators.  
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Category iii a, “You have been deceived by orators” 
This frequently attested descriptive topos reminds the audi-
ence that they have been the victims of deception in the past 
and acts as a warning for the future. It is only implicitly linked 
to the ethos of the speaker and his opponent, instead placing the 
responsibility upon the audience (cf. cat. i c).  
In the wider context of a passage in the speech Against Timar-
chus, Aeschines has warned the judges to be wary of Demos-
thenes’ deceptive rhetoric (1.170), explained how he can carry 
them away to discussions of irrelevant points (173–175), and 
urged them to resist his tactics. He then goes on to praise the 
Athenian laws and commitment to justice, yet alleges that in 
the courts and assembly meetings the Athenians are being de-
ceived into considering extraneous issues, thus introducing new 
habits into public life (177–178):  
ἐγὼ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας ἐπιδείξω. ὅτι τοὺς µὲν νόµους τίθεσθε ἐπὶ 
πᾶσι δικαίοις, οὔτε κέρδους ἕνεκ᾽ ἀδίκου, οὔτε χάριτος οὔτ᾽ 
ἔχθρας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ µόνον τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συµφέρον ἀπο-
βλέποντες· ἐπιδέξιοι δ᾽ οἶµαι φύντες ἑτέρων µᾶλλον, εἰκότως 
καλλίστους νόµους τίθεσθε. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καὶ τοῖς δι-
καστηρίοις πολλάκις ἀφέµενοι τῶν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγµα λόγων, 
ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν ἀλαζονευµάτων ὑπάγεσθε, καὶ πάντων 
ἀδικώτατον ἔθος εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παραδέχεσθε· ἐᾶτε γὰρ τοὺς 
ἀπολογουµένους ἀντικατηγορεῖν τῶν κατηγορούντων. 
I shall explain the reasons for this. It is because in making the 
laws you take account of all the principles of justice. You do not 
act for dishonest profit or favour or enmity, but consider only 
justice and the public good. And being naturally more intel-
ligent, I think, than other men, as one would expect, you make 
the best laws. But in the Assembly and the courts you often lose 
sight of the arguments relating to the main issue; you are misled 
by deceit and posturing and admit the most unjust practice into 
your trials. You allow the defendants to bring counteraccusa-
tions against their accusers. 
This passage has strong legal-ideological overtones: the Athen-
ians are being praised for the operation of their constitution 
and legal system, but it is pointed out that during trials they are 
often deceived into considering extraneous issues. The impli-
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cation is that this is out of character, un-Athenian. This anti-
deception topos tries to project the image of the dikastai as 
custodians of the Athenian constitution in order to encourage 
them to resist deception. The fact of deception thus works as a 
reminder that that they should stay true to their Athenian char-
acter.  
Category iii b, When the demos reversed the effects of deception… 
This sub-category of anti-deception topoi appears to be the 
flip-side of the preceding one. The dikastai are reminded of 
cases in the past when they defeated their deceivers; this should 
encourage them to rise up against deception in the present.  
In the peroration of the speech On his Return, Andocides seeks 
to empower the Athenians in the assembly to overturn his pen-
alty of exile and draws a comparison to the overthrow of the 
Four Hundred. He maintains (2.27) that just as they were de-
ceived into substituting tyranny for democracy, so the decision 
to punish him was the result of deception. Therefore he urges 
them to overturn the penalty unfairly imposed on him just as 
they had overturned the tyrannical regime (28, transl. Mac-
Dowell):  
βουλοίµην µέντ᾽ ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὑµετέροις αὐτῶν πράγµασιν, 
ἐπειδὴ ἐξουσίαν ἐλάβετε, τὰς τῶν ἐξαπατησάντων ὑµᾶς ἀκύ-
ρους ἔθετε βουλάς, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾧ περὶ ἐµοῦ ἐπείσθητε γνῶναί τι 
ἀνεπιτήδειον, ἀτελῆ τὴν γνώµην αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι, καὶ µήτε ἐν 
τούτῳ µήτε ἐν ἑτέρῳ τῳ τοῖς ὑµῶν αὐτῶν ἐχθίστοις ὁµόψηφοί 
ποτε γένησθε. 
But just as in your own affairs, as soon as you could, you invali-
dated the measures of the men who deceived you, so too, with 
regard to the inappropriate decision which you were persuaded 
to take about me, I should like you to make their decision in-
effectual, and neither in this nor in anything else ever to vote on 
the same side as your own worst enemies. 
The imperative to take action is underlying this topos, too (cf. 
cat. i c), as the dikastai are portrayed as custodians of the re-
stored democracy. Andocides associates deception of the demos 
with the traumatic period of the oligarchy of the Four Hun-
dred; now the restored democracy is presented with a new op-
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portunity to rectify another wrong committed by the oligarchy.  
So far, I have discussed the ways in which passages detailing 
the workings of deception and nine anti-deception topoi are 
used by the orators to portray negatively the ethos of their op-
ponents, and at the same time undermine their arguments or 
bolster the speaker’s own arguments. I have suggested that in 
certain cases the discourse of deception might aim to incite 
anger against the opponents and encourage the audience to 
adopt the suggested course of action. I shall now explore how 
contextual factors affect the orators’ use of the discourse of 
deception and suggest reasons for the differentiated rhetorical 
strategies observed.  
Contextual factors and the use of the discourse of deception 
This analysis of anti-deception topoi and passages comment-
ing on the opponent’s deception has shown the ways in which 
they fitted the speakers’ rhetorical strategies of characterization 
within a given speech. Examination now of the frequency of 
vocabulary of deception in deliberative and forensic speeches 
reveals patterns of usage within and across oratorical genres 
and even specific types of speeches. These patterns in turn will 
highlight the limits of the discourse of deception in a given con-
text.  
i) Oratorical genre: deliberative vs. forensic speeches  
The first observation arising from such an examination is 
that there are significant variations between deliberative and 
forensic speeches in the use of the discourse of deception. But 
since the sample of deliberative speeches is relatively small and 
comprises mainly assembly speeches by Demosthenes,39 a com-
 
39 Nineteen speeches fall under the category of deliberative oratory: 
Andoc. 3, Lys. 34, Dem. 1–16, [Dem.] 17. I do not exclude speeches such 
as [Dem.] 7 (probably by Hegesippus), 13, 17, the authorship of which is 
disputed, or ‘speeches’ such as 11 (On Philip’s Letter), 12 (Philip’s Letter), which 
are rhetorical compositions in epistolary format. Although many of Isocra-
tes’ speeches (e.g. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14) deal with deliberative themes, they are 
not, strictly speaking, deliberative orations as they were not meant to be 
delivered. They also contain strong epideictic features. 
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parison of forensic with deliberative speeches preserved in the 
Corpus Demosthenicum will be more helpful.40 The frequency of 
vocabulary denoting deception in the Demosthenic forensic 
speeches is almost double that in deliberative orations (see Ap-
pendix 2 for references): in the latter there are 28 attestations in 
a total of 703 chapters of Greek text (0.040 words per chapter), 
while in the former there are 219 attestations in 2917 chapters 
(0.075 words per chapter). As we have seen, the first category 
of anti-deception topoi is not used in any of the extant de-
liberative speeches to discredit an opponent:41 the exception to 
this rule is the villain looming large in the Greek world, Philip 
of Macedon, whose character was attacked in assembly debates 
fiercely and repeatedly.42 These results seem to confirm that, 
despite the existence of overlaps between genos dikanikon and 
symbouleutikon (e.g. symbouleutic themes are frequently em-
ployed in forensic speeches of public character), different rhe-
torical protocols were adhered to and different strategies 
adopted in the law courts and the assembly respectively. They 
also confirm that the law courts offered orators greater scope 
for invective and characterization of the opponent than did the 
ekklesia, where etiquette probably imposed limits on the use of 
personal invective.  
These variations in the rhetorical strategies adopted might 
also be explained with reference to the different perceptions of 
the role of the speaker in the ekklesia and the dikasterion: in a de-
 
40 E.g. in each of two speeches by Andocides, 3 (a deliberative speech, 41 
paragraphs long) and 1 (forensic, 150 paragraphs), there are two attestations 
of the discourse of deception, while in his remaining two forensic speeches 
there is one attestion in each. Such results clearly are not statistically signifi-
cant. In the Corpus Lysiacum a comparison between the one extant speech of 
deliberative character (34; see n.41 below) and the forensic orations is 
equally unhelpful. 
41 Lys. 34.1 is an exception but this is probably a pamphlet and not a 
speech delivered in the assembly; see Dion. Hal. Lys. 32. 
42 E.g. Dem. 2.7, 8, 6.23, 7.25, 8.62. Dem. 7.5 insinuates that there are 
Athenian politicians deceiving the people and thus doing Philip’s bidding. 
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liberative context, the orator was expected to act as an advisor 
and teacher of the demos, helping it reach a decision beneficial 
to the polis as a whole (sympheron is the primary objective of 
deliberative oratory: Arist. Rhet. 1362a).43 Conversely, in the 
adversarial forensic context the orator was taking part in a legal 
action and was expected to demonstrate the justice or injustice 
(Rhet. 1358b) of a legal case, thus helping the dikastai reach a 
just verdict. And while we do occasionally hear reports of 
speakers allegedly launching personal attacks against political 
enemies from the bema of the ekklesia, such behaviour is por-
trayed as inappropriate, transgressive, and characteristic of 
sycophants rather than civic-minded politicians.44  
ii) Forensic speeches: public vs. private cases  
When one turns to the use of the discourse of deception in 
the genos dikanikon, another difference emerges between public 
and private cases: there are 234 attestations of the discourse of 
deception in speeches delivered in public prosecutions (in a 
total 3921 chapters of Greek text: 0.596 words per ch.) and 79 
in speeches delivered in connection with private suits (in 1967 
chapters: 0.040 words per ch.). In the Demosthenic corpus the 
public/private distinction is more marked and vocabulary of 
deception occurs twice as frequently in public (0.087 words per 
ch.) as in private speeches (0.0487 words per ch.). In the con-
text of a public prosecution, where questions of public concern 
were foregrounded, the recourse to deceptive rhetoric on the 
part of the opponent could be portrayed as a matter of com-
mon interest. Conversely, in private suits deception was a 
matter ultimately affecting the actual parties to the suit and 
perhaps a small number of their relatives/associates. Demos-
thenes seems to be employing the discourse of deception more 
frequently than other orators in his public speeches, yet this 
does not alter the overall pattern, which suggests that there was 
 
43 See Ober, Mass and Elite 166–170, and Yunis, Taming Democracy 72–76, 
257–262; cf. Dem. 4.22, 8.57.  
44 E.g. Dem. 4.44, 8.1, 25.41, 47, 58.40.  
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more room in public cases for the rhetorical deployment of the 
concept of deception.  
iii) Forensic speeches: prosecution vs. defence speeches 
The limitations on the use of this rhetorical strategy become 
clearer when one considers the the relative rhetorical and legal 
position of the two parties. As already suggested, some anti-
deception topoi (cat. i a, b) occur only in prosecution speeches, 
whereas others (cat. ii c) were deemed more appropriate to de-
fence speeches. In public prosecution speeches the frequency of 
vocabulary of deception is three times higher (207 attestations 
in 2842 chapters: 0.0728 words per ch.) than in public defence 
speeches (27 attestations in 1079 chapters: 0.025 words per 
ch.). This pattern is confirmed by an examination of private 
prosecution and defence speeches: there are 71 attestations in 
the former (in 1527 chapters: 0.046 words per ch.) and 8 in the 
latter (in 440 chapters: 0.018 words per ch.). This suggests that 
the discource of deception was an effective strategy of char-
acterization for the prosecution but that the rhetorical job of 
defendants (and their supporting speakers) was far more chal-
lenging: they found themselves at the receiving end of allega-
tions of deception and could only defend their ethos, while their 
ability to mount counter-attacks was quite limited.  
iv) The legal context  
Although deception might take place in both the public and 
the private spheres, in the assembly and the agora, Athenian 
law differentiated between these settings and forbade deception 
of the demos in the ekklesia. The available legal procedures iden-
tified the assembly as the civic space where deception of the 
people could be held to take place,45 with the law courts as the 
 
45 Curses were pronounced before every meeting of the ekklesia against 
anyone deceiving the demos, the boule, and the Heliaia (Dem. 23.97), but it is 
clear from the nomos eisangeltikos (referred to at Dem. 20.135, [Dem.] 49.67, 
and quoted at Hyp. 4.8) that making deceptive promises to the demos in the 
ekklesia is meant. Dem. 20.100 seeks to extend the application of the law to 
cover the law courts and the Council of 500, but this is a loose interpreta-
tion of the law by Demosthenes in order to reinforce the seriousness of his 
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place for trying and penalizing deception.46 The legally circum-
scribed anti-deception context of the assembly may have been 
an additional factor discouraging speakers from employing the 
discourse of deception against opponents except in a neutral, 
depersonalized way, or when referring to Philip; often decep-
tion is described as a fact of past history,47 or used to encourage 
the demos to take action in the present. At the same time, in a 
forensic context, the adversarial nature of trials and the avail-
ability of penalties contributed to a more direct use of the 
discourse of deception.48 The higher the stakes in a trial (e.g. in 
a public case), the more intense the personal invective in 
prosecution speeches and the more frequent the discourse of 
deception. In private cases, differences between types of suits 
also affected the way the discourse of deception was employed. 
For instance, in speeches delivered in diadikasiai the discourse of 
deception is very sparsely used (8 attestations in 246 chapters; 
0.032 per ch.); after all, diadikasiai only decided between the 
merits of two competing claims (usually regarding inheritance) 
and did not impose any penalties on any of contestants.49 
Conversely, in the eight extant speeches delivered in dikai 
pseudomartyrion (private prosecutions for false witnessing) the 
discourse of deception is more frequently used (29 attestations 
in 518 chapters: 0.056), although there are also variations 
___ 
pledge. On this point see C. Kremmydas, Commentary on Demosthenes Against 
Leptines (Oxford 2012) 364–365. 
46 The available legal procedures against deception were eisangelia and 
probole. On eisangelia see Hyp. 4.7–8 and M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia. The Sov-
ereignty of the People’s Court (Odense 1975); on probole see Ath.Pol. 43.5 and A. 
R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens II (Oxford 1971) 59–64. 
47 E.g. Dem. 5.10 (τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισµούς), 6.23 (φενα-
κιζοµένην τὴν πόλιν), 8.63 (and [Dem.] 10.65, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τὴν εἰρήνην 
ποιήσασθαι, ποσ’ ἐξηπάτησθε, πόσων ἀπεστέρησθε;), 15.16, 16.2. 
48 On deception through witnesses see Dem. 19.177.  
49 Note however the parakatabole, which was essentially a deposit of 10% 
of the value of the estate and was meant to discourage the reopening of dia-
dikasiai; see Harrison, The Law of Athens II 181–183. 
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between individual authors (e.g. higher frequency in Demos-
thenes and Apollodorus than in Isaeus) and speeches.50  
v) Specifics of forensic cases  
Specific features of individual forensic cases may also explain 
variations in the use of the discourse of deception. Two 
prosecution speeches by Demosthenes stand out for their sig-
nificantly higher frequency of the discourse of deception: i) in 
Against Aristocrates51 the concept of deception plays a central, 
dual role: first, because the honorific decree52 for Charidemus 
had been suspended at the probouleumatic stage through a 
graphe paranomon, deception of the demos was still a distinct pos-
sibility, if the dikastai acquitted Aristocrates in the trial and the 
people then ratified his decree in the ekklesia.53 Second, decep-
tion is presented as one of the attributes of Charidemus’ char-
acter, career, and behaviour towards Athens, and therefore it 
should disqualify him from Athenian civic honours. ii) Demos-
thenes’ prosecution speech On the False Embassy delivered at 
Aeschines’ euthyna has deception at its very centre.54 Demos-
thenes’ bitter rival is accused of having misled and deceived the 
demos in connection with the peace treaty with Philip. Since this 
trial is the culmination of Aeschines’ euthyna (he had been an 
elected ambassador in the embassy affair), it is hardly surpris-
ing that Demosthenes would attempt to maximize the impres-
sion of his opponent’s wrong-doing by repeatedly employing 
 
50 In these speeches the frequency of the discourse of deception per chap-
ter of OCT is: Dem. 29 (0.066 words: defence), Dem. 44 (0.058: prosecu-
tion), [Dem.] 45 (0.034: prosecution), [Dem.] 46 (0.142: prosecution), Dem. 
47 (0.158, the highest: prosecution), Isae. 2 (0: defence), Isae. 3 (0: prosecu-
tion), Isae. 6 (0.015: prosecution). 
51 42 attestations in 220 chapters (0.190 words per ch.).  
52 See 57–59 above on deception through documents. 
53 M. H. Hansen, “Graphe Paranomon against Psephismata not yet Passed by 
the Ekklesia,” The Athenian Ecclesia II (Copenhagen 1989) 271–281, esp. 274–
279, argues that suspended decrees would be automatically ratified on the 
acquittal of the accused. 
54 52 attestations in 343 chapters (0.157 words per ch.). 
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the discourse of deception as he seeks the maximum penalty for 
him (e.g. 19.3, 131).  
Conclusion  
It is not suprising that the ideologically charged concept of 
deception was used by the Attic orators to bolster the speaker’s 
credibility and undermine that of his opponent in the assembly 
or law courts. In fact, the discourse of deception was only one 
of the strategies by which speakers might engage in diabole 
against an opponent and promote their own ethos. I hope to 
have shown that, as a strategy of rhetorical characterization, it 
was highly flexible and adaptable: the orator could choose from 
a range of anti-deception topoi depending on the rhetorical 
intensity he wished to express; he could also purport to expose 
to his audience the ‘dark secrets’ of the opponent’s deceptive 
rhetoric, thus showing his own knowledge and experience. We 
have also seen that it is context-sensitive: factors such as the 
oratorical genre, the relative position of the speakers, pro-
cedural considerations, and specific features of a given speech 
could determine the way it was used.55  
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55 Early versions of this paper were delivered at research seminars at the 
Department of Philology of the University of Peloponnese and the Institute 
of Classical Studies in London. I am grateful to the audiences at those 
seminars and especially to Mike Edwards, Nick Lowe, Eleni Volonaki, and 
Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanos for their feedback. I also wish to thank my 
colleagues Lene Rubinstein and Jonathan Powell for commenting on writ-
ten drafts. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the GRBS editor, 
Prof. Kent Rigsby, and the anonymous reader for their helpful suggestions 
and corrections. 
 CHRISTOS KREMMYDAS 87 
 
————— 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 53 (2013) 51–89 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: Typology of anti-deception topoi 
Cat. i a  
“He/they will attempt to 
deceive you”; “he is 
expecting to deceive you”; 
“they want/hope/ to 
deceive you”:  
Aeschin. 1.93, 3.48, Dem. 
32.31, 33.36, Isae. 4.1, 21, 
8.3, 9.27, 11.22, Isoc. 14.7, 
15.92, Lycurg. 1.55, Lys. 
5.4, 13.70, 30.34, 31.16, 
34.1 
Cat. ii a 
“I shall not (appear to) 
deceive you/lead you 
astray”:  
Aeschin. 3.176, 190, 
Dem. 5.10, 20.88  
Cat. iii a 
“You are being (/have 
been) deceived by 
orators”:  
Aeschin. 1.178, Dem. 
19.29, 23.95, 145, 
158, 160, 162, Hyp. 
Eux. fr.A r. col. 45.17–
23, Lys. 12.63, 14.36  
Cat. i b  
“You will (not realize that 
you have) be (/been) 
deceived,” “you will be 
deceived,” “I will tell you so 
that you do not find that 
you have been deceived”:  
Aeschin. 1.117, 3.11, 168 
Cat. ii b  
“I am foretelling you so 
that you are not 
deceived without 
realizing it,” “I will not 
allow you to be 
deceived”: 
Aeschin. 3.35; Dem. 
6.29, 16.3, 20.125, 
24.190, [45.44], Lys. 
31.16 
Cat. iii b  
When the demos 
reversed the effects of 
deception: 
Andoc. 2.28, 
Antiph. 5.91 
Cat. i c  
“Do not be deceived by 
him”: 
Dem. 19.216, [Lys.] 6.41, 
Lys. 31.16, Hyp. Phil. 
fr.15b5, Hyp. Dem. fr.3 col. 
6, Isae. 8.3, Isoc. 19.47 
(delivered in an Aeginetan 
court)  
Cat. ii c  
“He/they will say I 
deceive you”:  
Dem. 18.276, 20.98 
 
 
Cat. i d 
“You are deceiving (them)/ 
have deceived them/he has 
deceived you”:  
Aeschin. 3.237, Dem. 32.15 
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APPENDIX 2: Frequency of deception discourse56 
 (ἐξ)απατ- φενακ- παρακρου- παραγ- (ἀπο)πλαν- 
ἐξαπατ-  
3 (x 5)  
Aeschin.  
 
  ἀπατ- 
1 (x 3), 2.124 
 1.170  3 (x 2) 
ἐξαπατ-  
1.60, 2.82, 3 (x 
2), [Andoc.] 
4.29  
Andoc. 
ἀπατ- 
    
ἐξαπατ-  
1.19, 5.91, 6 (x 
3)  
Antiph. 
ἀπατ- 
5.22, 6.7 
    
Dem.  ἐξαπατ-  
2 (x 2), 3.19, 
5.10, 6.23, 
7.25, 8 (x 3), 9 
(x 2), [10.64 (x 
2)], 15.16, 16.2 
(x 2), 18 (x 8), 
19 (x 31), 20 (x 
13), 21 (x 4), 22 
(x 4), 23 (x 22), 
24 (x 2), 26.20, 
29.54, 30.24 (x 
4), 33.36, 35.22 
(x 2), 36 (x 3), 
37 (x 5), 38.17, 
39 (x 7), 41.21, 
43.38, 44.39, 
45 (x 2), 46 (x 
3), 47 (x 13), 
48.36, 49 (x 3), 
50.15, 52.20, 
53.29, 54.38, 
56.44, 58 (x 3), 
59 (x 11), 61.32, 
2.7, 
4.38, 
5.10, 
6.29, 
9.8, 
[14.3], 
18 (x 2), 
19 (x 
14), 20 
(x 2), 
21.204, 
22 (x 5), 
23 (x 
14), 24 
(x 4), 25 
(x 2), 
29.36, 
31.12, 
32.31, 
56.31, 
58.43, 
62 
(Exord.  
x 2), 63 
2.5, 7.5, 
15.8, 
[17.13],18 
(x 2), 19 (x 
4), 20 (x 2), 
21.160, 22 
(x 3), 23 (x 
3), 24 (x 4), 
25 (x 2), 
26.21, 29 (x 
2), 31.12, 
32 (x 2), 
42.27, 43 (x 
2), 44.7 (x 
2), 56.18, 
62 (Exord. x 
3), 63 (Epist. 
x 2) 
20.98, 
22.34, 
23.215, 
45.87, 
46.1 
 
 
56 Where there is a single attestation in a speech, the full reference is given; where 
there are multiple attestations in a speech or within a specific passage, the number of 
attestations is noted in brackets. 
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62 (x 13), 63 
(Epist. 1.14) 
ἀπατ-  
[10.76], 11.7, 
23.98, 44.19, 
47.9, 59.56, 62 
(Exord. 49.3) 
(Epist. 
5.4) 
ἐξαπατ-  
Dem. fr.3 col. 6, 
Euxen. col. 45, 
Philipp. 15b 
Hyper. 
ἀπατ-  
Athen. col. 12,  
fr.21 
Hyp. 
Athen. 
col. 1 
Dem. fr.3 
col. 6, 
fr.134 
  
ἐξαπατ-  
4 (x 4), 5 (x 6), 
6.62, 8.3 (x 2), 
9.27, 11 (x 2) 
Isaeus 
ἀπατ- 
5.14 
 4.14, fr.3.2    
ἐξαπατ- 
8.10, 10.7, 
11.24, 12.101, 
14.7, 15 (x 5), 
17.51, 19.47 (x 
2)  
Isoc. 
ἀπατ- 
15.199 
Isokr. 
17.36, 
19 (x 5), 
21.269 
12 (x 3)  7.77, 13.15 
ἐξαπατ- 
1 (x 4) 
Lycurg.  
ἀπατ- 
1.86 
 1.139    
Lys. ἐξαπατ- 
4.15, 5.4, 6.41, 
12.38 (x 2), 
13.70, 14.36, 
15.10, 19.61, 
20.20, 27.7, 
30.34, 31.16, 
34.1 
 
    
 
 
